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Abstract—Many people assume that cloud audit is no more
difficult than IT audit in general. We provide an outline of the
evolution of cloud, providing an explanation of how it differs
from conventional IT. We then discuss some of the benefits
and drawbacks of cloud, particularly in connection to audit
challenges, highlighting the dangers and shortcomings of many
approaches.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing offers the possibility of a substantial
economic benefit to firms and governments, yet at the same
time, increases complexity and risk. This results in an inter-
esting dilemma. On the one hand, potential cost savings of
50 - 90% [1] are possible, which is highly attractive, but on
the other hand, complexity can increase exponentially, placing
significant increasing risk on business and government alike.
In previous work [2] on enhancing cloud security and
privacy, we addressed issues of the cloud service provider’s
(CSP) lack of accountability in the standard service level
agreement (SLA). We mentioned the importance of the role
assurance plays, and the two main mechanisms used to achieve
this, namely compliance and audit. In this paper, we will
address some of the issues relating to audit. In order to
understand how the use of cloud impacts on the audit process,
and how it differs from conventional IT audit, we need to first
understand what audit is, why we need to do it, who should be
doing it and how it should be done. We must also understand
what special difficulties the use of cloud brings to audit. We
therefore revisit our definition of audit.
Audit (OED [3]: “To make an official systematic examina-
tion of (accounts), so as to ascertain their accuracy”) requires
outsiders who are deemed to be both objective and expert to
form their own opinion of what is being audited and then to
publicly state their confidence (or otherwise) in the reliability
of what they have investigated. Auditing is not straightforward
or easy. Just as with accounting auditors, objectivity is difficult
when companies pay auditors directly and auditors would
also like to be retained for the following year. Audit is also
potentially very expensive if done well by the best experts in
the field and there is a temptation to reduce the experts’ role
to one of advising, often writing checklists to be administered
by qualified technicians.
We start by considering the purpose of audit, who should be
carrying it out, and how it should be done, which we address in
Section II. The remainder of the paper is organised as follows:
Looking at past corporate computing models, Section III
provides us with an understanding of how corporate computing
has evolved over recent years, how these stages of evolution
have developed, and how they compare and impact on cloud
computing. In Section IV, we look at how audit is currently
performed. In Section V, we question whether there are any
weaknesses in this approach and; in Section VI, we touch on
some of the cloud security compliance issues. Section VII,
considers how to tackle these weaknesses; and finally, in
Section VIII, we discuss our conclusions.
II. THE PURPOSE OF AUDIT
We consider three main purposes of audit, the most widely
understood of which is the statutory requirement for financial
statements to be audited by an independent external auditor,
which has been a cornerstone of confidence in global financial
systems since auditing was introduced. It provides assurance
that company managers have presented a “true and fair” view
of a company’s financial performance and position, underpin-
ning the trust and obligation of stewardship between company
management and the owners of the company, the shareholders.
A second purpose of audit is IT systems audit. Traditional
audit approaches often involved treating IT systems as “black
box” systems, meaning trust was placed in the IT systems, and
looking at the functioning of the IT system was not considered
part of the statutory audit. The obvious shortcoming of this
approach was addressed by conducting a specific IT based
audit of the IT systems, to ensure these systems performed
exactly as expected. These audits are usually conducted by
IT specialists, often in conjunction with accounting audit
professionals to ensure the functioning of these systems are
properly understood. However, these are not mandated under
statute, which presents a weakness. In addition, there is no
requirement for an annual audit to be undertaken.
A third purpose of audit is compliance, either with regula-
tions, or more often with standards. This is often undertaken
to assure shareholders and other stakeholders that the company
is using best practice in its operations. This is particularly
the case in cloud computing, where systems are operated by
third parties beyond the control of the cloud user. Currently,
the difficulties associated with performing an adequate cloud
audit present one of the key barriers to cloud adoption [33].
These audits are not mandated under statute, which presents a
weakness, and there is no requirement for an annual audit to
be undertaken.
Statutory audit is an area which is well understood and
which benefits from over a century of research and experience.
Despite this, there remain differences of opinion and a number
of problems are yet to be resolved. Duncan and Whittington
provide some useful background in [5]. One of the main issues
concerns the independence of the auditor. The auditor is meant
to be independent, yet is paid by the firm they are auditing.
119Copyright (c) IARIA, 2016.     ISBN:  978-1-61208-460-2
CLOUD COMPUTING 2016 : The Seventh International Conference on Cloud Computing, GRIDs, and Virtualization
There may also be additional links between the auditor and
the firm, such as other non-audit consulting work undertaken
by the auditor. An audit firm is keen to remain auditor of the
firm for a long period of time to ensure continuity of income
and enhancement of profit. The firm is often keen not to change
auditor too frequently, lest their reputation suffer damage by
being unable to retain an auditor, as well as trying to keep costs
to a reasonable level. Audit firms are keen to undertake non-
audit consultancy work in order to further maximise revenue
and profits. The firm is generally keen for this practice to
take place, due to perceived cost savings to the firm. These
arrangements can potentially create tensions, which in some
cases might affect the impartiality of the auditor, hence some
jurisdictions seek to limit consultancy by auditors. Despite
issues, financial auditors are heavily regulated, audits are
mandatory and must be carried out every year.
Some industries are regulated and often the regulator will
assure themselves of compliance with regulations through the
use of audit. In the UK, organisations such as The Office of
Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem); The Office of Water Ser-
vices (Ofwat); The Office of Telecommunications (Oftel); The
Postal Services Commission (Postcomm); The Civil Aviation
Authority (CAA); The Office of the Rail Regulator (ORR); The
Office for the Regulation of Electricity and Gas in Northern
Ireland (Ofreg); and The Office of Communications Ofcom)
will often use reports given by the company’s auditor. These
will generally be carried out based on the requirements of
the licence granted by the regulator. The Financial Conduct
Authority (FCA) and the Prudential Regulation Authority
(PRA) usually take this view, although requirements here are
often more onerous. Some regulators, such as those responsible
for the regulation of professional services, may conduct the
audit using their own auditors, and frequency of audit is usually
less regular than with financial accounting.
Cloud audit difficulties have long been seen as a potential
barrier to cloud adoption [33] [6], and there is certainly a belief
that trust and privacy issues [7] [8] [9] [10] also need to be
borne in mind. A common theme is the recognition that cloud
audit is far harder to perform than for non-cloud systems.
Audit may be required to test internal control systems,
particularly where they involve financial reporting. This can
extend to IT audit, where rather than treat the IT systems
as black box components of the company systems, the IT
systems themselves are audited to provide assurance that they
are capable of delivering what is needed by the company. Audit
may also be required where a company is involved in a joint
venture project with another company or companies. The audit
requirements will usually be built in to the terms of the joint
venture agreement, specifying who will have what rights to
conduct the audit. Audit will not necessarily be mandatory, nor
will the auditors and audit process necessarily be regulated.
Another facet of audit is internal audit, where a company
seeks to assure itself of how well its internal processes are
running. Often this is continuous in nature, rather than spo-
radic. It is not mandatory and there is no regulation of the
auditors or the audit process. In previous work with Pym [11],
we developed a cloud assurance model which uses continuous
internal audit to help achieve the required security goals.
Audit can be used to test for fraud. Forensic audit is used
if fraud is discovered, to find and collect suitable evidence for
presentation in a court case, whether criminal or civil.
While auditing in the accountancy world has enjoyed the
benefit of over a century of practice and experience, cloud
computing audit can not be considered a mature field, and
there will be some way to go before it can catch up with
the reflection and rigour of work done in the accounting
profession. An obvious area of weakness arises when taking
audit professionals from the accounting world out of their
comfort zone, and placing them in a more technical field.
Whilst the use of people with a computing background can
overcome some of these issues, their lack of audit background
presents another weakness. Clearly further research will be
needed in this area.
Thus we see that there is more than one purpose for
conducting audit. We can have: statutory audit, which might
extend to audit of internal control over financial reporting and
fraud audit; IT audit, which covers the audit of IT systems; and
compliance audit, which will include regulatory compliance,
standards compliance, joint venture compliance, internal audit
and forensic audit. This list is not exhaustive. Of all the
purposes of audit, statutory audit is the most rigorous and
highly regulated, and for cloud, we could do well to learn
from this wealth of experience and rigour. In today’s world,
information can be just as valuable as money. The impact
of compromise, leakage, or theft of information can have a
catastrophic impact on cloud users, thus it makes sense to
consider applying equal rigour to the protection of information.
III. HOW DID CLOUD COMPUTING EVOLVE?
Corporates have long understood the potential benefits to be
gained from embracing information technology ever since the
early days of computing, when expensive mainframes were the
only option — open only to the largest corporates. Since those
days, modern information systems have evolved considerably,
leading to the development of complex, highly distributed
information systems and the need to police them properly. The
need to address traditional security issues of confidentiality,
integrity and availability (CIA) has increased this complexity
further, due to the need for scalability and redundancy. We have
seen a relentless explosion in performance, cost reductions and
wider accessibility for more and more corporates. Massive cap-
ital and operating costs no longer present the barrier they once
did. Technology has brought about major change in operational
efficiency. The invention of the internet has provided new
opportunities and increased exposure to new markets, yet at
the same time, threats to security and privacy have increased at
a frightening rate. The following list highlights nine evolutions
of corporate computing, with a brief explanation on each:
• Distributed Systems
• Business Process Management
• Service Oriented Architecture
• Grid Computing
• Utility Computing
• Virtualization
• Corporate Outsourcing
• Cloud Computing
• Economics of Cloud Computing
Distributed systems can be described as a software system
in which components located on networked computers com-
municate and coordinate their actions by passing messages, in
order to achieve a common goal. Early interest from military
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and defence agencies has contributed greatly to the benefits to
industry [12]. Early research effort from industry [13] [14] has
also been evident. This is still an active research area today,
with Lenk and Tai [15] addressing disaster recovery, Orgerie et
al. [16] seeking to reduce energy costs of distributed systems,
and Gottinger [17] who addresses the management issues of
improving economic mechanism design of distributed systems.
Business process management (BPM) is a subset of op-
erations management, which focuses on improving corpo-
rate performance by managing and optimising a company’s
business processes. Information technology (IT) can play an
important role in helping with this continual process of im-
provement, in which three basic elements are involved —
people, process and technology. This interaction between the
three elements perfectly describes the business architecture of
a company. Instead of adapting business processes to fit rigid
and intractable software, software could now be developed
to align with business practices. This allowed a better fit to
the way a firm did business, ensuring greater efficiencies. A
rich area of research for over three decades, from the early
work of Zachman [18], Norman et al. [19] through to later
work by Zhu et al. [20] and Herzberg et al. [21], it has
attracted great interest from a wide range of disciplines. The
opportunities offered by the development of business process
architecture would lead to issues in trying to communicate with
different computing systems. This lead to the development of
the term “Service Oriented Architecture (SOA)” [22]. SOA
was defined as “a software architecture that starts with an
interface definition and builds the entire application topology
as a topology of interfaces, interface implementations and
interface calls”. SOA didn’t get much traction until 2001 when
web services technology became widely adopted. In many
respects, web services gave SOA the foundation it needed to
become widely accepted. Again a healthy research area, still
very much active today, with Girbea et al. [23] addressing
optimisation of industrial manufacturing processes and Picard
et al. [24] presenting several alternative systems for enhancing
collaboration at inter-organisational level.
Grid computing is a varied collection of computer re-
sources spread over multiple locations designed to achieve a
common goal. Grid computing differs from conventional high
performance computing systems such as cluster computing.
Grid computers have each node loosely coupled and highly
distributed over a wide geographical area, whereas high perfor-
mance cluster computing generally has all the nodes physically
connected in the one location. Grid computers tend to be highly
heterogeneous, whereas a cluster will usually comprise a set
of identical hardware. Grid computing nodes can be owned
by a diverse range of organisations who share access to these
resources, whereas a cluster tends to be owned by a single
organisation. Grid computing started to gain traction in the
mid to late 1990s. Utility computing is a service provisioning
model in which a service provider makes computing resources
and infrastructure management available to the customer as
needed, and charges them for specific usage rather than a flat
rate. This model differs from grid computing as the service
provision comes from a single service provider, rather than
from a network of service providers. The model is not new,
evolving during the 1960s and 1970s. To facilitate this business
model, mainframe operating systems evolved to include pro-
cess control facilities, security, and user metering. The model
re-surfaced in the late 1990s with a number of large players
offering their own flavour. The development of virtualisation
software helped move the model towards cloud computing.
Virtualisation is the creation of a virtual (rather than
actual) version of something, such as an operating system,
a server, a storage device or network resources. It began in
1960s mainframe computers as a means of logically dividing
system resources provided by mainframes between different
applications, although its meaning has considerably broadened
in scope since then. Virtualisation allows spare capacity in
large server systems to be partitioned into self standing virtual
servers, which can provide “Chinese walls” between instances
to improve security where different customers use each of the
virtual instances. By 2003, the process of virtualisation had
become much more developed, yet few had offered resource
isolation or performance guarantees; most provided only best-
effort provisioning, risking denial of service. Large corporates
have traditionally had a high focus on efficiency and maximis-
ing profits. Consequently, they have long explored the potential
for cost savings to be had from outsourcing non core activities.
Indeed, they have also used extended outsourcing techniques
such as off-shoring which allow them to potentially reap far
greater cost savings than with normal outsourcing methods.
In the early days of mainframe computing, with no internet
to worry about, security was much less of an issue. However,
this would radically change with the arrival of the internet.
Cloud computing offers the possibility of a substantial
economic benefit to firms, yet at the same time, increases
complexity and risk further. This results in an interesting
dilemma. On the one hand, potential cost savings of 50 -
90% [1] are possible, which is highly attractive, but on the
other hand, complexity can increase exponentially, placing
significant increasing risk on business and government alike.
It will be useful to understand how the economics of
cloud computing has helped it to achieve such rapid market
penetration and deployment. While the incentives to use cloud
are very attractive, it brings with it other issues, such as
accountability, assurance, audit, availability, confidentiality,
compliance, integrity, privacy, responsibility and security, all
of which need to be properly addressed. Cloud computing
is the most agile of these systems, yet the most technically
challenging to secure, due to the multiplicity of relationships
within the cloud ecosystem.
IV. HOW IS AUDIT CURRENTLY PERFORMED?
We provide a brief outline here of how the approach to
financial audit evolved over the past century. Then, vouching
was the common mechanism utilised to conduct an audit. Here,
the auditor checked every single transaction in the company
books to vouch its authenticity. This was extremely cumber-
some, and expensive, to conduct, and in ignoring management
control systems, proved to be very inefficient. As companies
grew larger, this technique could no longer be supported.
A move to statistical sampling of transactions, together
with consideration of the effectiveness of internal controls,
allowed for a more efficient approach to the audit of larger
companies. Sometimes, fraud audit would also be carried out
to detect the possibility of fraud having occurred, whether from
external or internal sources. The use of checklists became
popular. Eventually companies started to use IT for their
financial systems. At first, the IT systems were treated as black
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box systems, where auditors merely considered how the input
was transformed into the expected output. Ultimately, this led
to the need to check the integrity of the systems themselves
and these too, were audited, creating a need for auditors to
broaden the scope of their learning. Over time, there was
a move towards a more risk based approach, with a greater
emphasis on performing due diligence, and less emphasis on
the use of the checklist. Discussing financial audit in more
detail is impossible within the constraints of this paper, but
provides a brief outline of how things have changed.
IT audit is not the same as financial audit. Financial audit’s
purpose is to evaluate whether an organisation is adhering
to standard accounting practices, and to ensure the financial
statements present a true and fair view of the information
contained in the financial reports. The purpose of an IT
audit is to evaluate the system’s internal control design and
effectiveness, through studying and evaluating controls and
testing their effectiveness. IT audit can be carried out by the
company’s internal audit department, an external agency, or
by the company’s own auditors. IT auditors are not regulated
to the same extent as financial auditors. Many of the large
auditing firms have set up specialised departments to handle
IT audits, with the benefit that they have access to the financial
audit expertise of the firm. Many IT audit firms do not have
financial audit experience. In general, there is a greater move
towards a checklist based approach in performing IT audits,
as with compliance audit, including security standards audit,
which traditionally use the checklist approach.
Joint venture audit is conducted in accordance with the
terms of the joint venture agreement, often by the internal audit
department of the partners, although some will use their exter-
nal auditors for this. Internal audit is sometimes performed by
employees with limited experience of how external financial
audit is conducted, resulting in a less risk based approach. This
can be useful in that their work can better inform the external
auditors when they arrive to carry out their audit. Forensic
audit will usually be carried out in response to the discovery
of a systems breach, usually by forensic IT specialists.
V. ARE THERE ANY WEAKNESSES IN THIS APPROACH?
We address some of the cloud security standards issues in
Section VI. The frequency of compliance auditing is generally
quite relaxed, in that reassessment need take place only when
system changes take place, or every few years, otherwise.
This completely fails to grasp the rapidly evolving nature of
security threats. There exists a clear need to employ some
method of continuous monitoring when it comes to security
management. Reports from global security companies, which
do not differentiate between cloud and non-cloud using com-
panies [25]–[27], suggest that over 85% of security breaches
involve a low level of technical competence, facilitated in-
stead by lack of understanding, lack of competence, or poor
configuration of systems on the part of victims. It would
be very useful to the research community if security breach
reporting companies were to publish cloud specific data. While
CSPs are very reluctant to publicise security breaches, last
year’s cloud breaches on iCloud, Target, Home Depot, Sony
and the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) may have more
to do with slack security culture and poor internal control
processes than cloud security weaknesses. Nonetheless, this
clearly illustrates the importance of the link between people,
process and technology.
Vouk [28] suggests a key element of SOA is an ability to
audit processes, data and results, i.e. the ability to collect and
use provenance information. Since SOA is not always included
in what is run on the cloud, there is a possibility that this
may present a weakness if steps are not taken to address this
shortcoming. Both Leavitt [29] and Wang et al. [30] suggest
the use of third party auditors, yet many CSPs to this day
are reluctant to offer this service. Armbrust et al. [33] suggest
lack of cloud audit-ability presents the number three barrier
to cloud take-up, and that more needs to be done to ensure
compliance with new legislation such as Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(SOX) and the Health and Human Services Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) regulations.
Chen and Yoon [31] suggest that an exceptionally robust
approach to cloud audit is required in order to ensure compli-
ance with all necessary legislation, regulation and standards.
Ramgovind et al. [32] suggest the question of whether the CSP
is willing to undergo audit represents a key security issue for
cloud use. Wang et al. [34] propose a publicly audited cloud
environment to ensure proper privacy is maintained. Zhou et
al. [35] in conducting a survey of CSPs and SLAs suggest
availability, audit, confidentiality, control, and data integrity
should be added to standard SLAs.
Grobauer et al. [36] suggest that without proper audit
provisions in SLAs, security and privacy will be compromised.
Doelitzscher et al. [37] propose a technical solution to this
issue using Security Audit as a Service (SAaaS) in conjunction
with software agents and a neural network to detect anomalies
and misuse of systems. Early results are promising, although
the system has yet to run live. Ruebsamen and Reich [38]
propose the use of audit agents to patrol a cloud environment
to ensure proper accountability. Lopez et al. [39] propose the
use of Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SHE) and Public-
Key Searchable Encryption (PEKS) in conjunction with audit
agents to ensure proper accountability in the cloud.
The approaches to financial audit and IT audit are well
understood, subject to our earlier comments, and are generally
perceived as fit for purpose. But, when using cloud computing,
everything changes. Instead of working on systems under the
control of the company being audited, these systems belong
to others, such as the CSP and any one of a number of other
actors involved in the cloud ecosystem. In previous work [2]
on enhancing cloud security and privacy, we drew attention to
the shortcomings in the standard SLA offerings of many CSPs.
Most lack any serious level of accountability, assurance, audit,
confidentiality, compliance, integrity, privacy, responsibility
or security, merely concentrating on availability as the only
measure of performance provided. Many are reluctant to allow
third party auditors into their premises, making effective audit
difficult, if not impossible.
One of the fundamental benefits of cloud computing,
agility, presents auditors with a very difficult challenge. Main-
taining an effective audit trail presents a serious challenge
when cloud instances are spooled up or down, sometimes by
the thousand, as needed. We address this specific issue in [40].
VI. CLOUD SECURITY STANDARDS COMPLIANCE ISSUES
Cloud security standards compliance presents a number of
interesting issues. First, in today’s global economy, an effective
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standard needs to be internationally accepted, which introduces
jurisdictional problems to the mix, coupled with the fact that
the pace of evolution of new technology far outstrips the
capability of international standards organisations to keep up
with the changes [41]. Second, standards compliance is not
mandatory, but merely a voluntary practice. While many large
organizations are keen to be compliant in order to provide
assurance to their clients, there is no legal obligation to do so.
Third, compliance with standards is also generally not required
by regulators, although there are signs that this attitude may
be changing. Fourth, compliance procedures will usually allow
a degree of latitude to the compliant company in respect
of the level of compliance they wish to achieve. Fifth, the
audit mechanisms used by compliance auditors can be flawed
[42]. Sixth, compliance auditors are not heavily regulated, as
they are for financial audit. Seventh, there are a great many
cloud security standards organisations in existence, often with
differing agendas, or merely concerning themselves with an
area of narrow focus. Eighth, no complete cloud security
standard yet exists. Nine, very few early standards took a
risk based approach, relying instead on the checklist approach
to compliance. Ten, knowing that a prospective company is
compliant is not enough. It is necessary to understand exactly
what level of compliance has been achieved, and this detailed
level of information is seldom disclosed.
Will compliance with a standard ensure security? In [5] we
argued that compliance with a cloud security standard is more
likely to ensure compliance with a security standard, rather
than achieve a meaningful level of security. We take a brief
look at some of the larger standards organisations.
The International Standards Organization (ISO) have done
excellent work on global standards, yet the benefit of this
approach is also a weakness. Seeking agreement across the
globe, prevents them from keeping standards fully up to date,
taking up to eight years to publish a fully agreed new standard.
It has taken some time, but it is encouraging that the ISO has
changed approach on ISO 27000 series standards to a risk
based approach, which started to filter through in 2014, and
this is very welcome. A few cloud standards are also starting to
filter through, but a full range of cloud standards is still some
way off. It is also encouraging to note that as new standards
are published, they are adopting a risk based approach.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), who produced one of the earliest clear definitions of
what cloud computing is, have long been of the view that a
risk based approach to cloud security would be more effective.
The US government finally accepted last year that this was a
sensible approach [43], and NIST have developed an excellent
risk based security standard. NIST produce excellent work,
but compliance with NIST standards often only extends to US
companies and those doing business with the US.
The Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) have been very active
in promoting cloud security standards. Their work is good,
but the weakness lies in the approach used for the method of
achieving compliance.
AICPA have produced a number of standards, including for
cloud. Their SOC2 standard for cloud has seen many CSPs
attain compliance, including across the globe. However, this
does not cover the case where the cloud service will potentially
affect the statement of financial information, for which a SOC
1 will be required. Where assurance on trust is required, a
SOC 3 report should be sought. While these standards apply
the same criteria for both cloud and non-cloud situations, it
would be naı¨ve to believe that non-cloud security measures
would be suitable for a cloud deployment.
Considerable work has been done on addressing legal
issues with cloud deployment [44] [45] [46] [47] [48]. With
the global reach of both cloud users and CSPs, this will help
to tackle outstanding issues of sovereignty and jurisdiction.
VII. HOW DO WE TACKLE THESE WEAKNESSES?
There needs to be a proper understanding of precisely why
a cloud audit is being performed. Different types of audit
require different approaches and it is important not to forget
the fundamental rationale for an audit. No matter what type
of audit is being carried out for whatever purpose, the auditor
needs to keep the fundamental requirements of the audit firmly
in mind throughout the audit.
The cloud security standards issue is a particularly difficult
challenge. We address this challenge in future work and make
some helpful suggestions here to address this problem.
The CSP problem with the standard SLA needs to be
addressed as an area of added risk. It is important to realise
just what this additional risk will mean to the company under
review. While it can be said that the standard SLA can offer a
better level of security than is available to the average small to
medium sized enterprise (SME) [49], it cannot be considered
foolproof. Companies, and their auditors, should recognise the
weaknesses inherent in the standard SLA and address these
specifically as an added risk to the company. We hope that, in
time, the changes we seek in [2] will come to pass.
The audit trail issue requires companies and their auditors
to recognise that the problem exists. In [40], we address this
issue and make some useful suggestions on how to tackle these
weaknesses.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Even centuries of experience of financial audit have not
solved all the problems of conflict of interest, or the clear
understanding and interpretation of the role of audit, hence the
need to consider some of the more fundamental issues facing
companies today. We must bear in mind that information is
now as valuable to companies as money, and deserves serious
thought and action to safeguard it.
We have looked at some of the challenges facing companies
who seek to obtain good cloud security assurance through au-
dit. We have seen how weaknesses in standard CSP SLAs can
impact on cloud security. We have identified issues with cloud
security standards, and how that might impact on cloud secu-
rity. Achieving compliance with cloud security standards is a
worthwhile goal, but success will only guarantee compliance
with the standard, not necessarily a useful level of security.
We have considered how the lack of accountability can impact
on security. We have also considered how misconceptions in
the purpose and scope of audit can also impact on security.
We have touched on how these difficult areas of security
might be approached as part of a comprehensive security
solution based on our proposed framework. Clearly, companies
could benefit from further research in several of these areas. In
particular, cloud audit could benefit from applying the rigour
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used by auditors in the accounting world when carrying out
statutory audit. However, we would caution that action is
needed now, not several years down the line when research
reaches a more complete level of success in these areas. The
threat environment is too dangerous. Companies have to act
now to try to close the door, otherwise it may be too late.
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